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Randomization  with Asymetric  Information 
ABSTRACT 
It is by now well-known  that,  in the presence of moral hazard or 
adverse selection,  randomization  of insurance  premia and benefits may be 
Pareto  efficient.  This paper:  i) provides a typology of the various forms 
that randomization  may take;  ii) derives necessary  and/or sufficient  condi- 
tions  for the desirability  of these various forms of randomization;  iii)  ob- 
tains some simple characterization  theorems  of the efficient  random policies; 
iv) gives some intuition  behind the results;  and v) considers  why randomiza- 
tion appears to occur less  often in practice than the theory suggests it 
should. 
Richard  Arnott  Joseph E. Stiglitz 
Department  of Economics  Department  of Economics 
Queens University  Dickinson Hall 
Kingston,  Ontario  Princeton University 
Canada K7L 3N6  Princeton,  NJ  08544 1 
During  the past  fifteen  years,  an extensive  literature  has developed 
analyzing  the structure  of adverse  selection  and moral  hazard (principal 
- 
agent) problems.  Early  on it was recognized  that  these  problems  may not have 
the usual  convexity-concavity  properties  so familiar  to economists;  and only 
a few years later,  it was realized  that this  in turn  implies that,  in a 
variety  of circumstances,  randomization  is  efficient.1 
The aims of this paper are:  (i) to provide  a typology  of the various 
forms  that randomization  may take;  (ii) to provide  necessary  and/or  suffi- 
cient  conditions  for the desirability2  of these  various  forms  of randomization 
in the context  of the standard  models  of an insurance  market with moral  hazard 
or adverse  selection:  (iii) to provide  some  simple  characterization  theorems 
of the efficient  random  policies;  (iv) to provide  some intuition  behind  the 
results;  and  (v) to consider  why randomization  appears  to occur less  often in 
practice  than the theory  suggests  it should. 
Many of the results  in the paper  are new.  Some (Propositions  2, 4. 
and 6), however,  are not.  In  particular,  several  recent papers  have investi- 
gated  the desirability  of randomization  of insurance  contracts  in the presence 
of moral  hazard (Holmstrom  [1979], Gjesdal [1982], and Fellingham,  Kwon,  and 
Newman [1984]).  All treat  a continuum  of possible  outcomes,  which tends  to 
obscure  intuition.  We rederive  their  results  for the two-outcome  case.  em- 
ploying derivations  which  highlight  the intuition, 
Section  1 treats  randomization  with  moral  hazard,  and section  2 ran- 
domization  with adverse  selection.  The concluding  section contains  a discus- 
sion  of why randomization  is not as common  as theory  suggests it should  be, 
which  casts  doubt on the appropriateness  of several  of the standard  assump- 
tions  employed in the incentives  and contract  literatures. 
Throughout  the paper, we cast  the problem in terms  of a monopoly  in- 2 
surer who maximizes  profits  subject  to providing  its clients  with an exoge- 
nously-specified  level of expected  utility  and subject  also to the relevant 
incentive-compatibility  constraints.  This allows  us to characterize  Pareto 
efficient  contracts.  Throughout  the paper,  competitive  equilibrium  (when  it 
exists)  corresponds  to the solution  of the monopoly  problem with expected 
utility  at the competitive  equilibrium  level(s).3 Thus,  when we say that 
randomization  is desirable,  we mean  that randomization  is Pareto efficient,  is 
profitable  for a monopoly  insurer,  and is a characteristic  of competitive 
equilibrium. 
1.  Moral Hazard 
Consider  the simplest  moral  hazard  setting.  There  are a large  number 
of identical  individuals,  each of whom realizes  one of two possible outcomes 
or events.  Either an accident does not  occur in which case the individual 
receives  w prior to insurance, or an accident4 does  occur in which case the 
individual  receives  w-d,  where  d Is  the accident damage.  The  probability  that 
an accident occurs  depends on the individual's accident-prevention effort, e; 
i.e.  p=p(e).  It is assumed  that  p'cO  and p''>O,  and that the individual al- 
ways  expends some effort  in the monopoly  solution.  Also,  individuals  acci- 
dent  probabilities  are statistically  independent. 
Moral hazard  arises  because  an insurer  is unable  to observe  effort. 
As a result,  insurance  contracts  cannot  be written contingent  on effort,  Ve 
assume that the insurer  can,  however, ohserve  its clients' total  insurance 
purchases..5  In these circumstances, the non-random insurance contract will 
specify a  (net)  insurance payout or benefit  a payable to an individual  if an 
accident occurs and an insurance premium fi  payable by the individual  if an 
accident does  not  occur.  Thus,  consumption (y)  is w-d÷a when an accident does 3 
occur,  and  w-J3 when it does  not. 
The individual's  expected  utility is 
EU = (l-p(e))U0(w-fl,e) 
+ p(e)U1(w-d+u,e),  (1) 
where  U0 is the no-accident  utility  function  and U1 the accident  utility  func- 
tion.  It is assumed  that 
ou.  a2u.  au 
I > 0, —i  < 0, 1  < 0  for j = 0,1. 
Note that this  specification  permits  utility  functions  to be  outcome- contin- 
gent;  the accident  may have  non-pecuniary  effects  or influence  tastes.  e 
shall  have occasion  to particularize  tl): 
(i)  separable  utility  function 
EU = (l-p(e))u0(w-fl)+p(e)u1(w-d+o)-e  (I') 
with u 
> 0  and u 
< 0 for j=0,l, and effort  is measured  in  terms  of the dis- 
utility  is causes. 
(ii)  separable,  event-independent  utility  function 
EU = (1-p(e))u(w-/3)+p(e)u(w-d+o)-e  (1'') 
The individual  chooses effort  to maximize  expected  utility,  taking 
the parameters  of the insurance  contract  as  given.  This yields  a function  or 
correspcndence  relating  effort  to the parameters  of the insurance  contract, 
e=e(a,3),  which,  when substituted  into  the expected  utility  function,  EU, 
yields  expected  utility  as a function  of a and , v(a,).  The insurers prob- 
lem is to choose (a,fl) to maximize  profits  subject  to providing  its clients 
with a given level of expected  utility.6 
The question  to be addressed  is;  Under  what circumstances  does ran- 
domization  of the parameters  of the insurance  contract  result  in a welfare 
improvement? 
The basic intuition  behind  why randomization  might  be desirable  is 4 
this:  Moral  hazard  causes  a tradeoff  between  risk-bearing  and incentives, 
since if full insurance  were provided  the insured would  take little  or no 
accident-prevention  effort.  As a result,  the deterministic  monopoly insur- 
ance contract  typically  entails  the insured receiving  less  than full insur- 
ance and expending  less than the first-best  (i.e., with effort  observable) 
level  of effort.  A compensated  randomization  of insurance  may cause the in- 
sured  to increase  effort  by enough  that  profits  are increased  The techniques 
of Rothschild-Stiglitz  [1970] can be used to ascertain  conditions  under  which 
a mean-preserving  randomization  of,  say, the payout  will increase  effort  at 
accident  avoidance;  randomization  will  do so provided  only that the first- 
order condition  for effort is convex  in  the payout.  Randomization  also  has a 
direct, negative  effect  on risk-averse  individuals.  Thus,  whether  randomiza- 
tion is desirable  depends on a careful  balancing  of the welfare  gains from  the 
mitigation of the moral hazard  problem  with the welfare  losses  from increased 
risk.  While the latter  depend  on the degree  of risk  aversion (which  depends 
on first and second  derivatives  of the utility  function),  the former  depend  on 
the degree  of concavity  of the first-order  condition  for effort  (which  depends 
on first, second,  and .kjd  derivatives  of the utility  function).  There  ap- 
pears  to be no &LjQLi reason  why the effort  effect  should  not outweigh  the 
risk effect.  This intuition  turns  out to be correct.7 
1.1  The  forms  of  randomization 
We will  consider  two  types  of  randomization.  If the realization  of 
the random  policy  occurs  before  the insured  individual  makes  his effort  deci- 
sion,  we shall  say that the randomization  is ex  ante;  if it occurs  his 
effort  decision,  In all cases, we assume  that  the individual  knows 
fully  the nature  of the randomization  being  undertaken.  With  ran- 
domization,  the insurer quotes  a set of random  policies  {a1,fl1,Q1}, which  we 5 
term the insurance  contract,  where  Q1 (EQ 
=  1)  is the probability  that policy 
i  will be assigned  to the individual  he has made his effort  decision. 
The individual  makes  his effort  decision  and only after  this finds  out which 
of the policies the insurance  company  has assigned  him.  With ex ante random— 
ization,  the insurer  again  quotes  a set of random  policies {o,,3,Q1}  but  nax 
is the probability  that policy  i will be assigned  to the individual  before 
he makes his effort  decision,  The individual  is randomly assigned  a policy 
and  makes his  effort  decision.  To simplify  the analysis,  we shall  con- 
consider  each form of randomization  in isolation,  Thus, in the subsection  on 
cx post randomization,  ex ante randomization  is excluded  by assumption,  and in 
the section on ex ante randomization,  cx post randomization  is excluded  by 
assumption. 
1.2  Ex post randomization 
The insurer  chooses  that insurance  contract  which  maximizes  his ex- 
pected  profits, subject  to providing  its clients with a given level  of expect- 
ed utility and taking  into  account the dependence  of effort  on the terms of 
the contract.  We can formalize  the problem as a  two-stage  (indirect  control' 
pob1em.  In the first  stage,  the individual  chooses  effort,  taking the para- 
meters  of the insurance  contract  as given,  to maximize  his expected  utility: 
EU  Thi(,fl,e)Q  (2) 
where 
u(1,fl,e)  U0(w-3,e)(l-p(e))+U1(w-d+e1,e)p(e). 
Thus, 
= argmax  EU.  (3; 
e 
In the second  stage,  the insurer  maximizes  its expected  profit,  taking  the 
dependence  of the accident  probability  on effort,  and the dependence  of effort 6 
on the parameters  of the insurance  contracts,  into  account.  It turns  out to 
be convenient,  in analyzing  the second  problem,  to embed in it the maximiza- 
tion condition  for the first stage;  we thus  write the insurer's  problem as 
{a1,fi1,Q1} 
(E1)(l-p(e)) 
-  (Ee)p(è) 
s.t.  i)  Ev(,fl1,ë)Q1 ￿ U (expected  utility constraint) 
ii)  = 1, 
iii)  ￿  0  Vi,  and  (4) 
iv)  ë = argmax  EU 
e 
Before  proceeding  to analyse  (4), we state: 
Lemma 1:  In the general concave programming  problem 
max  E F(x1)Q1  s.t.  E gJ(x)Q1  c3, E  = I 
{x,Q} 
1  1  1 




is a vector of control  variables,  applied with probability  Q1, j 
indexes  constraints,  F(.)  is a weakly  concave  function  and g3(.)  are strictly 
convex constraint  functions,  randomization  of x is undesirable. 
Lemma i is well-known  and  implies  in this context that randomization 
is undesirable  when the insurer's  profit-maximization  problem is concave. 
Since (4) is not in general  a concave  programming  problem, it appear 
that randomization  may in some circumstances  be desirable.  Characterization 
of the solution  to (4) is difficult.  Two results  may,  how- 
ever,  be obtained: 
Prooosition  1:  With ex post randomization,  the optimum can be achieved  with 
at most  three insurance  policies. 
Pronosition  2:  With separable  utility  functions,  randomization  is 
never desirable.8 7 
The first  Proposition  is established  as follows:  The first-order 
condition  of the individuals effort  choice  problem satisfies 
ôv(a. ,a• ,e) 
e'  i°  (5) 
(Because  exoected  utility is not necessarily  a concave  function of effort,  (5) 
is only a necessary  condition;  constraint  iv) is the necessary  and sufficient 
condition).  One may imagine  that the problem has been completely  solved,  and 
that one is told what the profit-maximizing  random  policies  are and what the 
individual's  level  of effort is, but  the probabilities  with which  the op- 
timal  random  policies  are assigned.  There are then three linear  equations  -- 
constraints  (i) and (ii)  in (4), and (5) 
-- that can be solved  for the optimal 
assignment  probabilities. Thus,  the assignment  probabilities  are determinate 
with  at most three random  policies. 
Proposition  2 is proved  by writing the insurer's  maximization  prob- 
lem in such a way that  Lemma 1  may be applied.  Suppose  that the level  of ef- 
fort chosen  by individuals  in the solution  to the monopoly insurer's  problem, 
has been determined.  And let  denote  the probability-weighted  average 




111  accordingly.  Then the analog  to constraint  i) of (4), written in 




+ e < -  U  (6a) 
and the analog  to constraint  iv) of (4) is 
(u1-il0)p'(e) 
-  1 = 0  (6b) 
(since  with separable  utility, expected  utility is a concave  function of  ef- 
fort). 
Substitute (6b)  into (6a) to obtain 8 
- 
-  p(e)  + e  <U  (7a) 
p'(e ) 
Since  constraints  (6a) and (7a) together  are equivalent  to constraints  (6a) 
and (6b) together,  the insurer's  problem may be rewritten  as 
mc  (E jqj)(1p(e*)) 
-  (E aji)p(e*) 
{a,fl1,Q1}  i  1 
s.t.  i)  (6a)  iii)  fJ ￿  0 Vi  (8) 
ii)  E  = 1  iv)  (7a) 
Since this programming  problem  has a linear  objective  function  and constraint 
functions  that are strictly  convex in  Lemma  I applies, and so  ran- 
domization  is undesirable. 
The "trick" in the proof  was to rewrite constraints  (6a) and (6b), 
where (6b)  is not a  convex  constraint,  as (6a) and (7a), both of which are 
convex  constraints. 
Proposition  2 and its proof are useful  because they provide  the ba- 
sis of a general theorem characterizing  sufficient  conditions  for randomiza- 
tion to be undesirable.  If the utility  function is not separable,  the equa- 
tion analogous  to (7a) is 




(1-p(:*))  + 
p(e*)] 
-U,  (7b) 
-  DU0  ôUø(w-fl,e  ) 
where 
U0  E 
U0(w-/3,e  .—  etc.  Since (7b) is not 
necessarily  a convex constraint,  it appears that randomization  may be desir- 
able.  Since  the analog  to (6a) for non-separable  utility is a convex  con- 
straint, if constraint (7b) is also convex, then by Lemma 1  randomization  is 
undesirable,  i.e.: 
ProDosition  3:  A sufficient  condition  for ex Dost randomization  to be unde- 
sirable is that  be convex in y0 and y1 jointly. 9 
Proposition  3 has an immediate  corollary: 
o3U  o3U 
Corollary  1:  If __.2  0  and _.__.1  0, then ex oost randomization  is  un- 
Oey0  ôeOy1 
desirable. 
Note that Proposition  2 is a special case  of Corollary 
Deriving  necessary and sufficient  conditions  for randomization  to be 
desirable is difficult.  A large  randomization  may be desirable,  even  when a 
small one is not, and the desirability  of large  randomizations  depends  on 
global  rather  than local  properties  of the functions  U0(.), U1(), 
and p(.), 
as well as the parameters  w and d.1°  Determining  necessary  and sufficient 
conditions  for a local  randomization  to be desirable  is presumably  possible. 
but since  efficient  randomization  may entail  three  random policies (recall 
Proposition  1), doing so would  be algebraically  very  tedious.  As a result,  we 
shall adopt  the more  modest  goal of deriving  necessary  and sufficient  con- 
ditions for a local  randomization  of the payout.  holding the premium  fixed,  to 
be desirable,U 
A necessary  condition  for a local  randomization  of the payout  to be 
desirable, is that a small,  mean-preserving  spread  in a, holding 1 fixed, in- 
crease  effort.  If this condition  is not satisfied,  then the randomization  not 
only lowers  expected  utility,  by exposing  the individual  to more risk,  but 
also decreases  profits  by increasing  the probability  of accident.  From  first 
principles,  or from Rothschild  and Stiglitz [1970]  ,  it  is straightfor- 
ward to show that  this randomization  stimulates  effort if and only if 
02U1  ô3U1 
2 
+  0. 
OeOy1 
A similar  necessary  condition is that a small,  expected-utility-preserving 
spread in  a, holding  fi fixed,  increase  effort.  If this condition is not 10 
satisfied,  the randomization  unambiguously  decreases  profits;  not only does 
the probability  of accident  rise,  but also compensating  the individual  for the 
risk he faces is costly.  From first  principles  or from Diamond-Stiglitz 
[1974]  ,  one  obtains  that  this  randomization  stimulates  effort  if  and  only  if 
o3U1  82U1  ô2U1/9y 
oU1/Uy1 
>0. 
The necessary and sufficient  condition  for a local  randomization  of 
the payout  to be desirable is that a  small,  expected-utility-preserving  spread 
in e, holding  /3  fixed, increase  effort  by enough  that profits are in- 
creased.  To calculate this,  we provide  a payout  of e÷A half the time and o-tt 
half the time,  adjusting e so as to maintain  expected  utility  constant,  and 
ascertain  whether doing so increases  profits;  that is, where  1i(e,;) 
we calculate  u 
=  +  .  Since 
LO  tx=0 
the randomization  is small,  u 
=  u 
= 0.  Hence, it is necessary  to 
examine  second  derivatives.  Specifically,  the local  randomization  is desir- 
2- 
able if and only  if 4_  u 
> o,  Tedious manipulation  gives 
dA 
d2ñ  p'(a+fl)  3l  OU1  8U1/0y1  D2U1/ôy  = 
EUee 
- 





iou  ou 1  02u  o2u 
EUee 
= -p"(U0-U1) -2p' 
-  +  (l-)  +  p  < 0 
from the second-order conditions  of the individual's  effort  choice problem. 
A necessary  and sufficient  condition  for a local  randomiza- 
tion of the payout to be desirable,  with the premium  held fixed,  is that 11 
2-  2 
> 0,  the expression  for -_  being  given in (9). 
with separable  utility, this condition  cannot  be satisfied,  but 
02T1  ô31.  theory imposes  no natural restrictions  on the values  of  or 
hence,  it appears that randomization  can be desirable.13 
The result is depicted in Figure  1.  The deterministic  optimum  is 
*  *  .  *  .  characterized by the contract (a ,fl ), utility  13  ,  and  profit  II  .  In the 
neighborhood  of the deterministic  optimum,  < 0  (otherwise,  both  profits  arid 
expected utility  could  be increased  with  a rise in a).  Since  also both the 
indifference  curve and iso-profit  curve through  the deterministic  optimum  have 
zero slope  in -a  space  at the deterministic  optimum.  randomization is 
desirable if the iso-profit  curve  has greater positive  curvature  than the in- 
difference  curve. 
1.3  Ex ante randomization 
The desirability  of ex ante randomization  depends on quite a  differ- 
ent set of considerations. 
Define  EU(11)  to be the maximum expected  utility as a function of th 
insurer's  (expected)  profit  per client,  11,  when only deterministic  contracts 
are admitted.  The desirability  of ex ante  randomization  depends on the cur- 
vature  properties  of  EU(fl).  This is shown in Figure  2.  Suppose,  for the sake 
of argument,  that the solution  to the monopoly insurer's  problem with deter- 
ministic  contracts  occurs  at C, with expected  profit  per contract  of 
JIG.  Now 
allow  ex ante randomization.  It is immediate  that no more than one policy, 
with a given level  of expected  profits,  need be offered in the profit-maxi- 
mizing  insurance  contract.  This implies that if the profit-maximizing  con- 
tract  contains  more than one policy, each must have a different  level  of 12 
profits associated  with it.  Suppose  the insurer  offers two ex ante random 
policies in his contract,  policy  A with  profits  11A <  and policy B with 
profits B  > 11c' 
with the probability  weights chosen so that the expected 
profit  from the pair of contracts  is  ll.  It is evident  from the diagram  that, 
as drawn,  this cx ante randomization  increases  expected  utility and is  there- 
fore desirable.  It is also evident  that:  i) the desirability  of ex ante 
randomization  stems from the convexity  of EU(I1)  near C;  and ii) that no more 
than two random policies  are needed in a profit-maximizing  contract  with 
ante randomization. 
We formalize this intuition  in a series  of Propositions. 
Proposition  5:  If EU(ll)  is concave,  ex ante randomization  is never  desirable. 
Proposition  6:  If EU(ll)  is convex  at the level  of profits  at the determirtis- 
tic monopoly insurer  profit  maximum,  then cx ante randomization  is desir- 
able.14 
Proposition  7:  With cx ante randomization,  no more  than two random  policies 
are required in the profit-maximizing  insurance  contract. 
In the absence of any moral hazard  problem,  expected  utility is a 
concave function of  II because  of diminishing  marginal  utility.  But with moral 
hazard, as  11 changes, effort  changes.  In the normal case,  as profit increases 
(decreases),  the individual  will expend  more (less) effort  at accident  avoid- 
ance.  If the absolute  value of the individual's  effort  response is greater 
for increases  in profits than to decreases (in a  sense to be made more precise 
below), expected utility may be a convex  function  of  II and  cx  ante  randomiza- 
tion may be desirable. 
It should  be clear from  Figure  2 that  convexity  of EU(fl)  at C  is not 
a  necessary condition  for cx ante randomization  to be desirable;  in part  icu- 
lar, non-local randomization  may be desirable  even when EU(ll)  is concave at C. 13 
The desirability  of non-local randomization  is difficult  to characterize 
because it depends  on global  rather  than local  properties  of the event-con- 
tingent utility  functions  and the probability  of accident  function.  In what 
follows, we shall  therefore  consider  only local  randomizations. 
To simplify,  we hold  fi fixed  at its level  in the absence  of randomi- 
zation (since  if expected  utility  can be increased  via ex ante randomization 
with  j3  fixed,  it can a fortiori  be increased  with  variable)  and treat the 
special case  of a separable,  event-independent  utility function (1')  Recall 
that from the individuals maximization  problem  without randomization,  we can 
express effort  as a function of the contract  parameters;  i.e. e=e(e.Th.  Now 
II=fl(l-p)-ep.  Thus,  we may write 
e(e,) = e[1  fi) 
= ê(ll,fl).  (10) 
Substitute  this into the expression  for expected  utility, 




- e.  (11) 
p(e) 
2 
Ex ante randomization  is desirable if  >  0.  The following  expression  for 
110 







e  Il-il 
'IC 
where subscripts  denote  partial derivatives  and 
Z(11,fl,ê(11,fl))a-p'(ê)  u(w-fi)-u w-d + (l-p(ê))-11)  - 1. 
p  (e) 14 
Se have thus established 
Prouosition  8:  A  sufficient  condition  for ex ante randomization  to be  desir- 
able is that the expression  on the RHS of (12) be positive. 
82  v  It is argued in Appendix 1 that —  can be positive if p'''  is sufficiently 
negative.15  The reason  for the complexity  of the result  is that what is rele- 
vant is the extent  to which  successive  increases  in II  lead to increases  in 
effort (and  how these increases  in effort  lead to increases  in the likelihood 
of a loss).  Since the level  of effdrt  depends on first derivatives  (say  of 
p(e)),  changes in levels  depend  on second  derivatives,  and differences  in 
changes in levels (which  are critical  for ascertaining  the convexity  or con- 
cavity  of profit as a function  of II)  depend on third derivatives. 
To simplify,  we have considered  ex post  and ex ante  randomization in 
isolation.  It should  be evident  that there  are circumstances  in which it is 
desirable  to employ  both forms  of randomization  simultaneously. 
2.  Selection 
It seems plausible  that randomization  can be desirable  when adverse 
selection is present,  by altering  the position  of the self-selection  locus. 
To investigate  this,  we treat the case  where there are two groups in the popu- 
lation,  one high-risk (H) and one low-risk  (L). 
Suppose  that,  in the absence  of randomization,  the monopoly insurer 
provides  group H with contract (&H,bH)  and group L contract (LL) as de- 
picted in Figure  3.  Group H utility is  U11,  and group L utility  U1.  The basic 
adverse selection  mechanism  should  be familiar.  If the insurer  were able to 
distinguish  between individuals  in the two groups,  the contracts  would  be 
(;HH) and  providing  the insurer  with ifiaximum profits consistent 15 
with the exogenous  utility  levels.  But with adverse selection,  the insurer  is 
unable  to distinguish  between  high-  and low-risk  individuals.  If it were to 
offer (a11,fl11)  and  (&LL)  both high-  and low-risk  individuals  would  choose 
(;LL)  If the proportion  of the population in the high-risk  group is above 
a  certain  critical level, which we assume is the case,  the insurer  maximizes 
its profits  by offering the pair of contracts  (a11,fl14)  and  where 
(LL)  is the most profitable  contract  that can be offered to the low-risk 
group consistent  with their obtaining  UL 
and with the high-risk  group prefer- 
ring  to 'self-select",  i.e. to choose (,  which is more expensive  but 
provides  more insurance,  rather  than the one designed  for low-risk individ- 
uals.  (LL)  lies  just below'  the intersection  point  of U11 and 
=  is  called  the self-selection  locus.  Throughout  this 
section,  we assume  that  profit-maximization  entails  the insurer  offering a 
different  contract  to each group. 
We now consider  the use of randomization  as a self-selection  device. 
Again, randomization  can take on two forms.  (Both are depicted in Table 1) 
In the first,  the insurer  announces  two contracts,  denoted  by A and B.  If the 
idividual  chooses contract  A, he will be assigned  policy (e,) 
with proba- 
bility  similarly  if he chooses contract  B, he will be assigned (a,fl) 
with probability  Q.  The  individual  reveals  his  type  by  his  choice  of  con- 
tract.  We say that offering  such a pair of contracts  entails ex post random- 
ization,  since  the uncertainty  is resolved  the  individual  chooses  be- 
tween the two contracts,  i.e. after  he has revealed  his type.  Traditional 
adverse selection  models  can be viewed  as treating  the case where A  and B both 
consist of a single  policy;  we ask here, when is this desirable? 
The second  form that randomization  may take is also  depicted in Table 
1.  The insurer  gives  the individual  a lottery  of policy  pairs, I 
= [(a',fl),  QiL 
= I.  The firm  then randomly assigns him a 
i=  1 
policy  pair, e.g. L.  with probability  Q1,.  Baying been  assigned a  policy 
pair,  say L1,, 





= (o,,4,).  The  individual  reveals  his type through  his choice  of 
A1, 
or 
B1,.  We say that such  a contract entails  ex ante randomization,  since  the 
uncertainty  is resolved  before the individual  makes his choice, and therefore 
before  he reveals  his type.  In the standard  adverse selection  model,  the in- 
dividual is offered a single  pair  of policies,  rather  than a lottery  of pairs 
of policies. 
We shall  employ  the following  additional  notation:  niC,  the popula- 
tion of group k, k=H,L;  k,  the accident  probability  of group k;  u, 
the 
utility function  for group  k in the event of no accident;  and u, the corre- 
sponding utility function  when an accident occurs.  Superscript  k(=H,L) on a 
contract parameter  indicates  that the corresponding  contract is designed for 
group k. 
We first  prove: 
Pronosition  9:  The insurer  can always  do at least  as well with cx nost ran- 
domization,  as with cx ante randomization. 
£f:  Suppose  the  exogenous  utility  levels  are  and  Then  the  profit- 
maximizing cx ante random  contract  solves 
max  H((lB)QflHHEQH)L((lL)QLLEQL) 
II  ,B\ , L  aL\  i  i  i  i 
,a1,))J 
s.t.  1)  (l-p11)Eug(w-fl)Q.+p'Eu(w-d+a)Q. ￿  t)11  (expected  (13) 
i  1  1  1  1  utility 
constraints) 
ii)  (lpL)EuL(w/3L)Q+pLuL(wd+aL)q ￿ 
iii)  ￿ 0  Vi 
(self-selection  constraints) 17 
iv)  =  1,  Q ￿  0  Vi. 
Consider the profit  maximization  problem identical  to (13)  in all 
respects except  that  the set of constraints  iii)  is replaced  by 
> 0. 
We term this the modified maximization  problem.  Since this constraint  is 
weaker than the set of constraints  iii) of (13), profits are at least  as 
high for the modified  maximization  problem  as for (13).  But the modified 
maximization  problem  is that of a monopoly insurer  who undertakes  ex post 
randomization. 
e  have established  that ex ante randomization  is unnecessary  by 
showing that ex post randomization  is always  at least  as profitable.  If there 
are zestrictions  on cx post randomization-  ex ante randomization  may still be 
desirable.  However,  we shall  not attempt to dtermine  conditions  under wnich 
cx ante randomization  is, in  fact,  desirable. 
Proposition  9 is useful  because  it enables  us to focus on cx POSt 
randomization.  randomization  of the high-risk  group's  policy is unaw- 
biguousiy  harmful since it reduces  the profitability  of the high-risk group's 
'untract,  while leaving  the low-risk  groups  contract  unchanged. 
randomization  of the low-risk  group's  policy,  meanwhile,  has two possibly  off- 
setting  effects. On one hand,  the low-risk  individuals  must be compensated  for 
th  increased  risk they then face.  On the other hand,  such randomization  may 
weaken  the  self-selection  constraint.  If high-risk  individuals  are very risk- 
averse,  they will shy away  from the randomized  policy,  allowing the low-risk 
individuals  to obtain  more insurance  on average than  they otherwise  would. 
The Propositions  that follow  capture this intuition. 
We start  by considering  the case where  high-  and low-risk individuals have the same tastes  (event-contingent utility functions).  Let  h be the cer- 
tainty-equivalent insurance premium  corresponding  to the  fl random  con- 
tract  defined implicitly  by 
u0(w-b)  S 
u0(c-B)q.;  (l4a) 
and a be the certainty-equivalent  insurance  payout.  defined implicitly  by 
u1(w-d+a) 
m S u1(w-d+a)Q.  (14b) 
The expected utility  for an individual  in group  k is, using (14), 
EUK = (lpk)(E uo(w-fl)Q) 
+ pk(E  u1(w-d+e)Q) 
= (1pk)u0(wb) 
+ k u1e-d+a); 
thus, expected  utility  can be expressed  in terms  of the certainty-equivalent 
premium and payout  corresponding  to any ex post random  contract.  The self-se- 
lection  constraint,  meanwhile,  can be written as 





u1(w-d÷ah) ￿ 0,  (16) 
where (a'C,bk)  is the certainty-equivalent  of the random  contract 
designed  for group  k.  Next,  define  B 
'f 4 to be the average premium in 
the random policy  designed  for group k, and  n S  at to  be the correspond- 
ing average  payout.  Risk aversion implies  that ak < k and bk ￿ k with at 
least  one of the inequalities  being  strict if the corresponding  contract is 
randomized. 
Recall that  we have assumed that profit-maximization  entails  differ- 
ent contracts  for the high-  and low-risk  groups.  Thus,  where  Uk is the exoge- 
nous level of expected  utility  for group  k, the group  k expected  utility  con- 
straint,  using (15), may be written as 
(lpk)u0(wbk) 
+ pku1(wd+ak) ￿  Uk,  k=H,L.  (17) 19 
The insurer's  profit-maximization  problem, with ex post randomization,  may be 
written  as 
max  E  flk((lk)k 





i)  (16)  (the self-selection  constraint) 
ii)  (17)  (the expected  utility  constraints) 
iii)  ak < k  bk ￿ 
From this formulation,  it is evident that the profit-maximizing  contract pair 
has the properties  = ak and  = bk  for k=H,L,  and therefore  that ex post 
randomization  is undesirable. 
This result is stated  in16 
Proposition  10:  1ith adverse  selection  and two groups  who differ in risk but 
not in tastes,  ex post randomization  is never  desirable. 
The intuition  underlyg  this result  can be seen  from Figure 4.  Sup- 
pose that in the absence of randomization,  the profit-maximizing  deterministic 
contracts  are  and  corresponding  to which  are profit  levels, 
and ü'.  Because the contracts  are deterministic,  the premiums  and payouts 
equal  their  corresponding  certainty-equivalents,  which  we denote  by (,b1) 
and (aL,bL),  respectively.  Since  expected  utility  can be expressed in terms 
of the certainty-equivalent  premium and payout,  we may portray  the determinis- 
tic profit-maximizing  pair of contracts  in a-b space:  lies  at the 
point of tangency of iP and the profit  line  bH(lpH) 
-  aHphi  =  while 
(LL)  lies at the point  of intersection  of (P and (P. E0 
in the Figure. 
Now consider  randomizing  the contract  for the low-risk  group, hold- 
ing (P and  fixed.  Since the randomization  does not alter the position of 
the self-selection  constraint  in a-b space, the low-risk  groups  certainty- 20 
equivalent  policy  remains  Since, with randomization, ￿aL  and 
L(bL  with at least  one of the inequalities  holding  strictly,  then 
<  - aLpL  =  Thus,  the randomization  reduces  prof- 
its on the low-risk  group's policy, while leaving profits or the high-risk 
group's policy  unaffected. 
We now examine the situation  where individuals  differ in terms of 
both risk class  and tastes  for risk.  We derive  a  condition  under  which a 
small  amount  of randomization  is desirable. 
We randomize  the contract  for low-risk  individuals  in such a way 
that:17  i) there  are two policies,  both with probability  .5;  ii) low-risk 
individuals'  utility is the same with either  policy  and equals  their certainty 
utility;  and iii) the profit level  on the low-risk  contract is maintained. 
Randomization  will then be desirable  if (and  only if)  it lowers  the utility  of 
the high-risk individuals  when they hold the low-risk  contract, since if this 
happens,  the self-selection  constraint  is relaxed,  and the low-risk  contract 
can then be adjusted to increase its profitability. To simplify the algebra, 
it is assumed that both groups'  utility functions  are event-independent. 
The randomization  satisfies  the above  conditions: 
(1L)L(flL)LL(dL) 
=  (19a) 
(lp1)uL(w  4)+pLuh(wd+a) 
=  (19b) 
- pL(a+a) 
= 2ñL  (20) 
The expected utility  of a  high-risk individual  when  he purchases  a  low-risk 
contract is 
EU11 =  (21) 
It is shown in Appendix  2 that the first-order  effect  of an infinitesmal  ran- 
domization  is zero;  i.e. 
L  L 
= 0.  To ascertain  the desirability  of a 
da1  a1-a2 21 
2u11  small randomization,  we investigate  the sign of 
d 
1.  2  1.  L'  Define 
d(a1)  a1—a2 
L 
(ut)'  the slope  of the low-risk 
= 
—2—-t 
,  indifference curve  with  (22a) 
P  U0  the contract (e,8i) 
k'  the ratio of the marginal  utility 
k — UQ)  of  consumption  in the no-accident 
22b  r  — 
(k)' 
'  to accident  events  for group k with 
1 
the contract (4,fl) 
k  (u)'  the (local) coefficient  of absolute 
A.  -  ,  ,  risk aversion  for group  k and event  (22c) 




Note that:  1) i < 1;  ii) with risk aversion  and incomplete  insurance,  r1<l 
for k=H,L;  and iii) the greater  the degree  of risk aversion,  the smaller is 
rk (holding  (a,fi) constant).  Then it can be shown  (the procedure  of the 
derivation  is explained  in Appendix  2) that for A 
>> 0  (finitely greater than 






.  (23) 
Let Ak denote  the minimum of the coefficient  of absolute  risk aver- 
sion  for u1(y)  with y e  [w-d,wJ,  and Ak the corresponding  maximum,  k=H,L. 
Propositions  11 and 12 then follow  from  the derivation  of (23). 
Pronosition  11:  For any  (w,d,uL(.),pH,pL)  such that d>>0,  ph!>>pL,  and AL 
finite, there is a finite  number  such  that with j1>, ex post ran- 22 
domization  is desirable. 
The intuition  for this result  is straightforward.  When a high-risk 
individual  is infinitely  risk-averse,  he will care  only about the worst  pos- 
sible outcome.  Since  the randomization  worsens the worst possible  outcome 
when the low-risk  contract is  bought,  it reduces  the utility of the high-risk 
individual  when he purchases  the low-risk  contract,  which relaxes  the self- 
selection  constraint. 
j,jon12:  For any (w,d,uH(.),pH,pL)  such that  d>>O, and H>>L there 
is a finite  number  AL such  that with  AL<A, cx post randomization  is de- 
sirable. 
Consider the extreme case where  A' is close  to zero.  Then the ran- 
domization  undertaken is almost  a randomization  along the low-risk  budget 
line,  Because the high-risk  group is risk-averse,  its expected  utility in- 
creases less from the increase  in insurance  in one policy than its expected 
utility decreases  from the almost  same-sized  decrease in insurance  in the 
other OiiCy.  Hence,  the randomization  loosens  the self-selection  constraint. 
Note  that none of the above  results  depend  on constancy  of absolute 
risk aversion  and that finite  randomizations  may be Pareto-improving  even  when 
infinitesmal  randomizations  are not. 
We have examined  the circumstances  under  which randomization  is  de- 
sirable  with either  moral hazard  or adverse  selection,  and explained  the re- 
sults,  Future  research should  extend  these  results to the general situation 
where both moral hazard  and adverse  selection  are present. 
3.  Discussion 
In the previous two sections  we employed  standard assumptions  to  de- 
rive necessary  and/or  sufficient  conditions  for the randomization  of insurance 23 
contracts  to be desirable.  We investigated  the desirability  of randomiza- 
tion by analyzing  whether  randomization  could increase  the profits  of a mono- 
poly insurer  faced  with expected  utility  constraints.  It bears repeating  that 
if each insurer  can observe  his clients  total  purchases  of insurance,  compe- 
titive  equilibrium18  coincides  with the solution  to the monopoly insurers 
problem  when the expected  utility  levels  are those  that would  obtain in  com- 
petitive  equilibrium.  Hence,  all the results  of the paper apply  to competi 
tive equilibrium. 
In the absence  of relevant  empirical  work,  it is  not possible to sa 
how stringent  the conditions  we derived  for randomization  to be desirable  in 
fact are.  However,  none of our arguments  implies  that randomization  is 1ncr- 
mally'  undesirable.  Thus,  it is remarkable  that randomization  of insurance 
contracts  is not in fact observed.  This statement  needs  to be qualified 
somewhat  since  the seeming  capriciousness  of the tax collector  and insurance 
adjustor could  be veiled  forms  of randomization9 Nevertheless,  we know of 
no explicit random  contracts  in competitive  insurance  markets.  How can e 
explain  this apparent  discrepancy  between  theory  and fact? 
Along  with the possibility  that the conditions  for randomization  ar 
never met,  we have come  up with six reasons  why randomization  might not occur 
as frequently  as the theory  suggests.  Each  of these  reasons leads  one to 
question the appropriateness  of some  of the assumptions  underlying  our ana- 
lysis  and more  generally  underlying  much of the literature  on incentives  and 
contracts,  particularly  that  focussing  on non-linear  contracts. 
1.  Firms may not have discovered  the advantages  of randomization  or else cus- 
tomers  may be reluctant  to purchase  random  insurance  policies  since they do 
not understand  them.  To the extent  that this  explanation  is valid,  one must 
question the appropriateness  of assuming  that  the contracting  parties exhibit 24 
unbounded  rationality 
2.  A related  argument is that it is costly  to write  down and enforce complex 
contracts.  This argument is consistent  with the observation  that non-  stochas- 
tic contracts  are almost invariably  considerably  less  complex than contract 
theory  predicts.  If this argument  carries  force,  then contract  theory should 
treat  the costs  of complexity. 
Simple  contracts  may be observed  not only because  the costs of com- 
plexity are high,  but also because  the benefits  are low.20'21 
3.  Even in those circumstances  where  randomization  of insurance  contracts  is 
desirable,  insured individuals  would obtain  insurance  against the randomiza- 
tion if they could.  They would perceive  the benefits  of such randomization 
insurance,  but because they act non-cooperatively  would  neglect  that,  in re- 
sponse  to everyonets  purchasing  the randomization  insurance,  accident insur- 
ance companies  would be forced to offer less  attractive  contracts  in order to 
break  even.  Full randomization  insurance  would  completely  neutralize  the ef- 
fects  of randomization  of the accident insurance  contract,  and so accident 
insurance  firms would  have no incentive  to randomize.  The analysis assumed 
away such randomization  insurance.22  But with limited  observability,  which 
underlies  both moral hazard  and adverse  selection,  the assumption  may be 
unwarranted.23 A more satisfactory  analysis  would describe  the economy in 
such a way that which  markets are present and what contracts  are enforceable, 
are derived rather  than  assumed. 
4.  In some contexts (e.g., the draft in the U.S.)  lotteries  are commonly  re- 
garded  as fair,  in other contexts  as unfair (horizontal  equity).  While the 
persuasive  modelling  of fairness and horizontal  equity  has proved elusive, it 
may be that consumers  would  find random  iriurance  policies  unattractive  be- 
cause  they view them as unfair. 25 
5.  For other, familiar  reasons,  one may question  the appropriateness  of  em- 
ploying  von Neumann-Morgenstern  expected  utility theory (?Iachina [1987]). 
6.  A sixth  reason  why such contracts  may not be employed is that individuals 
may not trust  their insurers  to randomize  in the manner  specified in their 
contracts.  To know whether a  firm is complying  with  the contract,  an individ- 
ual must know not only which  policy  he has been assigned,  but also  which pOli- 
cies  have been assigned  to all its other  clients.  Even if he were able to 
verify  that the firm assigned  the policies  with the contractually-specified 
probabilities,  the firm could still  cheat  by assigning  the policies in a sys- 
tematic  way, e.g.  to friends  or to those  offering  kickbacks.  Whether reputa- 
tion would be an effective  enforcement  mechanism  in this context is  moot. 
A final point  is that precluding  randomization  by assumption  is not a 
satisfactory  way of treating the empirical  fact  that random  contracts  are not 
observed.  First,  by prohibiting  randomization  from entering  through  the front 
door,  one might find it entering in disguised  form  through the back door.  For 
example, suppose  that the moral hazard  model  of the paper  were enriched  to 
allow for several  symmetric  types  of accidents.  If random insurance  contract 
were excluded  by assumption,  then in some circumstances  in which  ex ante ran- 
domization is desirable,  competitive  equilibrium  would  entail  extended  exclu- 
sivity (each  individual  would  purchase  all his  insurance  from a single  firm) 
and firms randomly  cross-subsidizing  between types  of insurance,  e.g.  one firm 
might  run a loss  on cancer insurance  financed  by its profits from automobile 
accident insurance.  Doing so would  allow firms  to indirectly  randomize.  Sec- 
ond, one cannot  be sure  that whatever considerations  (discussed  above)  result 
in random insurance  contracts  not being  observed  do not also have implications 
for the structure  of nonrandom  contracts.  For example, if complexity  is im- 
portant, the competitive  equilibrium  contract  may be simple,  linear,  and non- 26 
random.  But  if one were simply  to exclude random  contracts  by assumption, 
without  explicitly  treating  complexity,  the solution  might indicate  that the 
equilibrium  contract  would be highly  non-linear  and complex.  For both these 
reasons,  disallowing  random  contracts  by assumption  is likely  to generate 
spurious  results. Footnotes 
1.  The earliest studies  were in the context  of the problems  of optimal 
taxation:  Weiss [1976]  ,  Stiglitz [1982a, 1982b]  ,  and  Balcer  and  Sad- 
ka [1982]. 
2.  When we say that randomization  is  desirable",  we mean that therp 
exists  a Pareto-improving  randomization.  Also,  if randomization i5 
desirable,  it will be employed  by insurance  firms  in competitive 
equilibrium  (as long  as they  (an observe their  clients' total  pur- 
chases  of insurance)  and by a monopoly insurer. 
3.  This equivalence  can be established  on the basis of arguments  pre- 
sented in Arnott  and Stiglitz [1987b]. 
4.  "Accident"  may be reinterpreted  as "large  damage  conditional  on an 
accident  occurring",  and "no accident"  as 'small damage  conditional 
on art  accident  occurring". 
5.  The assumption  of a monopoly insurer  implies  this assumption.  This 
assumption is. however, consequential  in the competitive  equilibrium 
interpretation  -  see  Arnott  and  Stiglitz  {1987b] 
6.  This problem is treated exhaustively in Arriott  and Stigiitz fl9STa 
7.  This intuition  applies to what  we shall, in  the next subsection. 
identify as ex post randomization.  A rather  different  set of argu 
ments are relevant  for ex ante randomization; see below,  section 
1.3. 
8.  This Proposition  has been proven  previously  for the continuum  of  out- 
comes case by Holmstrom [1979] 
.  Our  proof, however, is new. 
9,  Since  they are expressed in terms  of the characteristics  of the con 
straint set, Propositions  2 and 3, as well as Corollary  1, apply to 
any (a,fl)  (and  the associated  levels  of U  and  e) and not just to profit-maximizing  a and  jl associated  with a given level  of expected 
utility.  The same remark  applies  to Proposition  4. 
10.  Furthermore,  with non-separable  utility,  effort  need not be a  con- 
tinuous  function  of the contract  parameters.  We have chosen  not to 
treat  this complication. 
Ii,  We have considered  other two-dimensional  perturbations:  i) random- 
izing  the premium,  holding the payout  fixed;  and ii) randomizing  the 
payout, while varying  the premium  to maintain  profits constant,  and 
investigating  the change in expected  utility. 
12.  This Proposition  has been proven  previously  by Gjesdal [Proposition 
3,  19821  for the continuum of  outcomes  case.  Our proof,  however,  is 
new. 
13.  esoai  L1982'  pps  382-3j  provides an  example in which exgt ran- 
domizat ion  is  desirable. 
14.  This Proposition  is similar to Theorem  3 of Fellingham.  Kwon,  and 
newne;n [1984] 
Feilinaham, Kwon arid  Newman  [1984,  pps.  296-297]  provide an example 
in which ex ante randomizatioe is desirable. 
16.  It can  also be proven,  rather obviously, that "with adverse selection 
and two  groups, randomization  is never  desirable  if the high-risk 
group  is less risk-averse than the low-risk group". 
17.  We would like to thank Stephen Slutsky  for suggesting  this randomiza- 
tion procedure  to us in another  context. 
i8.  By  competitive equilibrium,  we mean  a Nash  equilibrium in contracts 
with free entry  and exit.  In the case of adverse selection,  this 
statement  applies  only when competitive  equilibrium  exists  -  see 
Rothschild  and Stiglitz i9W  for a discussion  of non-existence  of competitive  equilibrium  in this context. 
19.  We consider  this unlikely,  however.  A more  plausible  explanation  for 
the randomness  of tax audits is that  decreasing  the probability  of 
audit, while  holding  the expected  fine constant,  reduces  administra- 
tive costs. 
20.  In moral hazard  theory,  it is assumed  that insurance  companies  know 
the accident  technology  and consumers  tastes  perfectly,  and in  ad- 
verse selection  theory  that they know consumers'  tastes and the com- 
position of the population  perfectly.  Intuition  suggests  that the 
more imperfect  is insurers'  knowledge,  the smoother  the optimal  con- 
tract and the smaller  the gains  from complexity. 
21.  In this context  it should  be noted that the literature  on the ran- 
domization  of insurance  contracts,  including  this paper,  has not at- 
tempted to measure the benefits  from randomization,  though  doing so 
would not be excessively  difficult. 
22.  The problem of "side-contracts"  is a pervasive,  though  neglected,  one 
in contract  theory.  For instance,  whenever  payments  schedules  are 
non-linear,  there is an incentive  for side-payments  and the creation 
of secondary  markets.  If the payment function is concave,  indivi- 
duals have an incentive  to smooth  measured  output (selling  output on 
the secondary  market  when output  is  high,  and buying  when it is low) 
and to make measured  output  more uneven  when the payment schedule is 
convex (e.g.  by introducing  randomization)  .The presence  of such se- 
condary markets provides  one explanation  for the linearity  of pay- 
ment schedules. 
23.  By treating  a  monopoly insurer,  the analysis assumed  that individ- 
uals'  total purchases  of accident insurance  are observable.  In these circumstances,  competitive  equilibrium  is characterized  by exclusiv- 
ity 
-  each  insurance  company will require  that its clientspurchase 
insurance  only from itself.  In this  case,  it is not inconsistent  to 
assume  away randomization  insurance,  since accident insurance  con- 
panics  may be able to observe their  clients'  purchases  of randomixa- 
tion insurance  as well.  Exclusive  accident  contracts  are also en- 
forceable  if the accident insurance  companies  cannot  observe indi- 
viduals'  total  purchases  of accident insurance,  but can enforce  re- 
fusing  to make a  payment in the event  of accident if the insured  re- 
ceives  payment  from any other company  for the accident.  This re- 
quires  that accident insurance  companies  monitor only victims.  With 
this more limited  form of observability,  it is not inconsistent  to 
assume  that accident insurance  firms  can enforce exclusive  accident 
insurance  contracts  but cannot  monitor  their clients'  purchases  of 
randomization  insurance. Bibliography 
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Derivation  of 
Define 
V(llThê(ll))=(l-P(ê))u(-fl)+P(ê)u{w-d+ 
-  ê  (Ai.1) 
p(e)  j 
and 
Z(ll,,ê(ll,fl)  = -p'(e)iu(w-a)-u  w-d+  (Al.2) 
L  p(e)  j 
Then 
8V  dv  (Al3) 
where subscripts  denote  partial derivatives  From the individual1s  effort 
choice  problem 
(A1.4) 
Combining (Al.3) and (A1.4) gives 
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.  (Al .7) 
After  substitution  of the expressions  for the various partial  derivatives, the 
resulting  expression  is extremely  messy.  It is not, however, difficult  to 
2 
establish  that the sign  of  can be positive.  The only  place where p' 
ôn3 
enters the expression  is through  Zee 
The full term containing  p''' is v 
- 
_!1! (-p'''(u0-u1))  Since  Ve>O Ze<O 
and 
u0-u1>O, 
then if p'''  is nega- 
tive and sufficiently  large in absolute  value,  will  be positive. Autendix  2 
d2EU11 I  Ferivation of 
d(a)20 
Let 
=  (uk(wd÷e)) 
-  (u(wflL))  (A2Ja,b) 
= d 
(uk(wd+eL))  = d 
(uk(wfiL))  (2ic,d) 
Total differentiation  of (19) and (20) gives 
d/3  rrl 
IxLl  1xL L)  11L) 
(A22a,b)  i  [i 
-  jlt 
L]  [1 
dfl  d  k41  = 
- 
= j  (A2.2cd) 
Now,  from  (21), 
dEUH 
(1  p) 
{ 
dfl  dfl)  + phIX11÷xl _] 
.  (A2.3)  -=-  -Y-  j 
When  the amount  of randomization  is infinitesmal,  a=a, 
H1H d3  -  d4 
d d  -  1.  Hence, 
dEU  = 0.  (A2.4) 
To determine the effect  of an infinitesmal  randomization,  we investigate 
d2ELI11  I 
d(a)20 
Substituting  (A2.2)  into (A2.3),  totally  differentiating  the re 
sulting  expression,  and using the above  relations  when the amount  of ran- 
domization  is infinitesmal  gives (23). Notational  Glossary 
Symbols in order of introduction  in text 
w  pre-  insurance,  no accident income 
d  accident  damage 
e  accident-prevention  effort 
p(e)  probability-of-  accident  function 
a  net  insurance  payout  with  an accident 
premium payable  if there  is no accident 
y  consumption 
EU  expected utility 
j  subscript  denoting  event  (j=O, no accident;  j=1, accident) 
U(ye) 
event- dependent  utility function 
u.(y)  utility-from-consumption  function  with separable  utility 
function 
v(a,fl)  indirect  utility function 
i  subscript  indexing  randomized  policy 
Iii  probability  of random  policy  i 
v(a,/J,e)  expected  utility function  with policy i 
x  control variable 
g3(.)  constraint  function j 
U  level of expected  utility 
e*  level  of effort  at the solution  to the monopoly insurer's 
problem 
average value of 
A  size  of randomization  of a 
II  expected  profit  on a  contract ê(fl,)  = e(a,fi) 
V(ll,fl)  v(a,) = V(ll,,ê) 
Z  net marginal  benefit of effort 
k  superscript  denoting  risk groups (H=high,  L=low) 
population  of group  k 
accident  probability  of group  k 
utility  function  for group k  with event  j 
a  certainty-equivalent  net payout 
b  certainty-equivalent  premium 
[(1ll)L]/[(1L)H] 
0  slope  of low-risk  indifference  curve 
rk  ratio  of no-accident  marginal  utility to accident  marginal 
utility  for group k 
(local) coefficient  of absolute  risk aversion  of group  k in 
event  j Ex post randomization  Ex ante  randomization 
—  Insurance  firm  offers two  — Insurance  firm  offers  a  lottery 
Contracts  f  policy  pairs 
A  B  L 
A  A  A  3  B.  B 
(c,d2j,Q7 
—  Individual randomly  assigned  L, 
with  probability  Q 
A  A  A  B  B  B 
—  Having been assigned  L. •  indcvtoual 
chooses  between 
N  N 
A 
1  c  =  1  A.  =  (c,3.) and 
1  I  1  1- 
B  B,  —  Individual chooses  A  or  B  B.  = 
1  ii 
—  Individual randomly  assigned 
—  Uncertainty resolved before  individ— 
A  A  ual's  choice  of policies.  insurance  policy  with 
probability  if chose  A, etc. 
— Uncertainty resolved  after 
individual's  choice  (of 
lotteries). 




Figure  1:  With  moral hazard,  randomiza- 






T>ll Figure  2:  With moral  hazard,  exante  randomization 
may be desirable.  (A weighted  average  of 
A and B yielding rr is  preferred  to C) 
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Figure  3:  Adverse  selection. b 
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Figure 4:  When  both groups  have the same  tastes,  randomization  is 
undesirable 